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ABSTRACT
Although an abundance of literature demonstrates that immigrant populations are less crime-prone
than the native-born population, the majority of Americans believe that immigration inherently
threatens the security of the United States. Because Americans are not well versed in the complex
issues of immigration and crime, public opinion is undoubtedly influenced by media outlets’
crafted narratives that simplify circumstances and events into easily digestible material. The
current study examines how media behavior changes and responds to social and political events
by examining “frames” utilized in articles that produce narratives about immigration and crime.
Using content analysis of over 1,700 articles published between 2014 and 2018, multi-level
models reveal that (1) over half of articles describe immigrants as crime-increasing; (2) some
frames are more likely to occur in response to specific events; and (3) some frames are less likely
to occur in response to specific events. I conclude with implications of consumer behavior and
ongoing debates and research on immigration and crime.
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INTRODUCTION
Since the 1970s, the foreign-born population within the United States has increased over 300
percent, even touching some rural and suburban communities that historically have not been
major destinations of foreign-born population settlement (Edwards and Liu 2018; Lichter and
Johnson 2009). In turn, debate about how immigration has reshaped the social fabric of the
United States has grown over the past several decades, as well. Today, the politically driven
criminalization of the foreign-born population remains a particularly prominent political and
social debate (Ellis 2006), one that has been amplified by advancements in technological
communication increasing access to the news and information allowing different (and often
antagonistic) narratives to compete with those that are more fact-based (Milan 2017).
The issue of narratives in news media remains an important feature of understanding
immigration and the criminalization of the foreign born because the American population, in
general, does not possess much direct knowledge regarding the intricacies of immigration policy
and immigrant communities. Instead, they often rely upon the media’s heuristic “framing” and
priming in order to interpret and more easily digest information regarding such complex issues,
like immigration and crime (Scheufele and Tewksbury 2007). Although this dynamic could
work to educate the American public on the empirical relationship between immigration, crime,
news media outlets provide platforms for “claimsmakers” – individuals, both legitimate and
illegitimate, who provide statements and narratives – to push agendas that may be detrimental to
the foreign-born population. For example, recent research shows that news media narratives
often link immigrants (especially the undocumented) to high crime rates (Harris and Gruenewald
2019), despite widespread contradiction within empirical research that immigration more often
reduces crime (Ousey and Kubrin 2018). The crime-prone immigrant narrative is then made
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easily consumable and accessible for audiences across the nation with little regulation. Perhaps
unsurprisingly, nearly two-thirds of Americans believe that immigrants make our communities
less safe and threaten national security (Gallup 2017; Hohmann 2011; Pew Hispanic Center
2015).
The global community gained a heightened awareness of how powerful the media can be
in shaping public sentiment about immigration and crime following the 2016 presidential
election of Donald Trump. Though the use of immigrants in this manner has been essential to
American politics since the birth of the nation (Barber 1992; Grigoryan 2019), the
immigrationcrime link became a primary element of Donald Trump’s platform when he asserted
that
Mexican immigrants were overwhelmingly responsible for increasing crime rates in the United
States, even if some “are good people” (Finnegan 2016: A00). Yet, this position contradicts
longstanding findings within criminology regarding the crime decline in the United States since
the 1990s and consensus that immigrants are less likely to commit crimes than their American
counterparts (Gramlich 2019; Harris and Feldmeyer 2013; Ousey and Kubrin 2018). Instead,
Trump used the news media to help craft a narrative for widespread public consumption in order
to advance specific policy ideas (e.g., the border wall).
Critically for the purposes of this project, research shows that policymakers, policy
entrepreneurs, and other “claimsmakers” strategically utilize the news media’s influence to push
forward policy agendas, including those directed toward the immigration and crime. Yet, there
remain important empirical questions that have yet to be addressed. In particular, there has been
limited research into whether and how media narratives change around “focusing events” and
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subsequent “policy windows,” which are the “opportunities for advocates of proposals to push
their pet solutions, or to push attention to their special problems” (Kingdon 1995: 165).
Critically, the emergence of a policy window, which cultivates an environment for legislation to
be pursued both locally and nationally, reflects “a confluence of events that allows advocates to
push their policy solutions to problems onto the political agenda” (Farley et al. 2007:345).
During this time (or even preceding it), narratives can be amplified by the news media, providing
political claims makers a platform by which conflicting arguments and solutions can be
disseminated to the general American population.
Building on these observations, I ask the following question: how does media framing of
immigration and crime change differ around focusing events and policy windows over the
20142018 period? This period is especially important to the immigration-crime debate in this
period that (a) immigration overall has decreased, although the non-native born population is
relatively high; (b) the economic boom of the late 1990s and early 2000s and the later Great
Recession paved the way for historical rates of inequality in the United States through the 2010s;
(c) the crime spike of the early-to-mid 1990s and subsequent decline in offending; as well as (d)
important immigration and crime events, like the expiration of DACA and deaths of Kate Steinle
and Mollie Tibbetts. In exploring this period, I aim to untangle how prominent national news
articles narratively describe the immigration-crime link in unique ways in and around these key
incidents.
In seeking to address these questions, I extend the growing literature regarding news
media influence on politics, society, and public opinion, as well as the academic study of policy
windows themselves (Kingdon 1995). Unfortunately, these topics traditionally have been
studied without much consideration to the mechanisms by which they collectively shape the
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public and political landscape, especially in regard to the link between immigration and crime.
Empirical evidence demonstrates that the media is capable of shaping (and reflecting) public
opinion by selectively articulating specific narratives and employing frames both intentionally
and unintentionally (Cervantes et al. 2018; Menjivar 2016). At the same time, prior literature has
also established that media framing of certain events can provide the circumstances by which the
“politics stream” gains traction – a necessary element for the creation of a fruitful policy window
(Farley et al. 2007; Menjivar 2016). Overall then, I aim to bring together these various themes
into an empirical examination of immigration-crime narratives over time and around focal
events.
More broadly, the relationship between news media framing relative to policy windows
has considerable, intergenerational consequences for both American society and the international
community by (in part) helping shape who the American public will consider to be deserving of
a life lived inside the United States. Likewise, it also impacts the measures that American
policymakers will take to deter and deport those who do not by illustrating how the foreign born
can become linked to social problems like crime. That said, the purpose of the current project is
to examine the relationship between the narratives employed by prominent news media regarding
the foreign-born population and crime with a particular emphasis on and how those narratives
correspond with important focusing events and policy windows over time.

REVIEW OF PRIOR LITERATURE
The Occupational Task of News Media
News media outlets and their journalists perform a significant role in democracies by serving as
the link between the general public and elite political decision makers. Advancements in news
communication technologies – particularly through smartphone applications – narrow the gap
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between the public and the elite, reinforcing the illusion for many that the news media’s political
leverage is a symptom of the 21 st century. Despite recent attention and concerns to the reliability
of news media outlets, the processes or tactics utilized by contemporary news outlets to gain
attention are neither novel nor unique; rather, news media creating a narrative or highlighting
stories that evoke a strong emotional response are present across the national news media
landscape and throughout time (Wettstein and Wirth 2017).
As one illustration, the 1800 presidential election of Thomas Jefferson brought about
highly politicized print news opinion pieces exaggerating the personal characteristics and
leadership capabilities of both presidential candidates, including an anonymous warning to voters
published in the Federalist Connecticut Courant. In particular, claims were made that the
election of Jefferson would surely bring the country to its knees, describing an apocalyptic
wasteland where “murder, robbery, rape, adultery, and incest [would] be openly taught and
practiced” (Digital History 2016). Although Jefferson ultimately became president, the 1800
election cycle drew attention to the media’s lasting tradition of selectively granting attention to
contentious topics that capture the attention of a national audience, coupled with framing
mechanisms that guide public opinion to a desirable outcome, contingent to the media outlet’s
bias (Wettstein and Wirth 2017).
As a more recent example, the media transformed the national political environment
around the publication of the 1998 Washington Post’s Special Report: The Starr Report. The
report, a lengthy federal government report authored by Independent Counsel Ken Starr, was
published first through the Washington Post as an un-tampered document, followed by CNN and
MSNBC with commentary. The report delivered though news outlets reached an estimated 20
million Americans, who read the report within two days of its publication (Kravetz 2009).
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Within three months of the report’s publication, President Clinton was impeached. Crucially,
some outlets framed the report as an indication of Starr’s fascination with sexually explicit
content, attempting to minimize the report as an exaggeration of President Clinton’s actions.
Other outlets praised Starr’s report, acknowledging Starr’s authority and describing him as a
public servant dedicated to justice. Although Clinton was more than likely to be impeached
consequential to the report’s findings, with or without mass publication, systematic framing of
the report’s contents by ideologically divergent media outlets along with widespread access to
the report ultimately contributed in part to the 1998 impeachment of President Clinton. The
American public became widely aware of Clinton’s misconduct, while news outlets shaped
narratives in ways that informed the public on how to respond to such transgressions.
What these examples illustrate is that, because media outlets have a finite window to
produce news stories, journalists allocate much of their coverage to “sudden, attention-grabbing
events” that consequentially “[advance] issues on the [policy] agenda” by heightening public
awareness of the issue at hand (Birkland 1998:53). The process by which these editorial
decisions are made, also referred to as agenda setting, is essential to understanding why some
topics receive more coverage in the media than others, and how the public interprets this
coverage in terms of urgency and necessity (Scheufele and Tewksbury 2007). Consequentially,
media cycles often result in short, rapid streams of coverage for specific topics that harness the
public’s attention as quickly as they lose it. Agenda setting successfully alerts the public to
social problems, but also struggles to produce meaningful solutions as a result of constantly
revolving coverage of competing issues (Allcott and Gentzkow 2017). On one hand, some
scholars consider agenda setting a harmful consequence of coverage, rather than a systematic
process by which the media seeks to advance the betterment of American society. On the other
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hand, as Birkland acknowledges, media coverage of focusing events has the potential to “serve
as important opportunities for politically disadvantaged groups to champion messages…
[previously] suppressed by dominant groups” (1998:54). The discrepancy between these
arguments rests upon the narrative – or frame – that journalists utilize, whether intentionally or
unintentionally, in the article.
Framing
Relevant to the current study, I highlight two key concepts that inform my discussion of media
treatments of immigration and crime over time and that build on the overall news media process
of agenda setting. The first involves the manner in which media sources narratively describe –
or frame – immigrants and immigration-related topics (I use the terms “frame” and “narrative”
interchangeably). Understanding narratives, or frames, is critical to understanding the role of
media because narratives impose a “cognitive style or a mode of thinking” upon consumers of
the information, ultimately manipulating readers’ interpretation of any given topic or issue (Ryan
2007:27). Media frames work to condense complicated, multifaceted circumstances into easily
digestible stories by “selecting and highlighting some facets of events or issues, and making
connections among them so as to promote a particular interpretation, evaluation, and/or solution”
(Entman 2004:5). Relevant to the current study, immigration and crime are both complex issues,
including such issues as refugees from crime and immigrant caravans, criminal behavior displayed
by specific immigrants or immigrant populations, the intricacies of foreign born status within the
criminal justice system, and even issues surrounding the legality of the foreign-born population’s
presence in the United States (i.e., undocumented immigration as a crime).
More broadly, all news media articles display bias to some degree, even if they intend to
deliver the most accurate and unbiased information possible (Wettstein and Wirth 2017).
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Indeed, bias in the media has recently been associated with the spread of “fake news,” muddying
the discrepancy between reliable news and manipulating media narratives. In turn, this
phenomenon appears hand in hand with the polarization of news media consumption in
American society (Allcott and Gentzkow 2017). Nevertheless, the media framing process
capitalizes on the consumption of confusing and contentious stories by removing context from
such stories and imposing a specific narrative, successfully drawing both attention and an
emotional response from the outlet’s audience.
A plethora of studies agree that agenda setting and framing are integral pieces of the news
media production cycle and are fundamental to current power structures in the political landscape
(Morstatter et al. 2018, Entman 2007). Although both agenda setting and framing are not
inherently detrimental to general understanding of a given topic, they do encompass a series of
processes by which outlets prioritize coverage of specific events over others; falsify reality by
distorting information; favor one interpretation of an event or policy over another interpretation
of said event or policy; and/or allows personal bias of the reporter to bleed through to content
production (Entman 2007). In any case, agenda setting in news media is inevitable to some
degree due to a variety of factors ranging from initial misreporting to the political leaning of a
journalists’ outlet, and is “ultimately an attempt to persuade the opinion of the reader” to adopt a
specific idea or perspective about a topic (Morstatter et al. 2018). A growing body of literature
agrees, though, that agenda setting – particularly in response to a focusing or political event – is
neither random nor accidental, but rather patterned, intentional, and occurs systematically.
For instance, specific to immigration and race, scholars retroactively acknowledge the
“moral panic” presented in the media directed towards people of color during the 1980s and
1990s as a classic example of agenda setting. During this time, the American public was
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“consumed by the looming threat posed by America’s [non-white] youth” via overrepresentation
of events such as the Central Park Jogger case, in which five people of color were convicted of
raping a white woman, and later exonerated (Moriearty 2010:850). The criminal framing of
nonwhite youths in the media heavily influenced public opinion and consequential policies
aimed towards “controlling” this demographic by intentionally producing news stories in which
white Americans were victimized by people of color and “outsiders”, either to promote personal
bias or
to increase readership.
Changes in media behavior do not only occur in response to focusing events, such as the
Central Park Jogger case, but also in response to shifts in the political landscape following
election cycles, the passage of legislation, as well as periods of social unrest. For instance,
following the passage of Arizona State Bill 1070 in 2010, media framing of immigrants as
threats to public security and the economy became increasingly prominent in both local and
national newspapers. Sequential media coverage exploring the intricacies of SB 1070 exposed
the public’s misunderstanding about the legal proceedings of immigration and role of law
enforcement in at the municipal level, as well as the ability of framing to manipulate public
opinion in favor of anti-immigrant policies (Fryberg et al. 2012).
A growing body of literature also suggests that in the past three decades, national news
outlets have engaged in a tradition of emphasizing “the negative consequences of immigration”
by increasing coverage of the socioeconomic conditions and crime rates of Latinx communities
(Abrajano, Hajnal and Hassell 2017). This increase in the prevalence of antagonistic frames –
particularly in articles published by conservative news outlets – directed toward immigrants
corresponds with a meaningful shift in public opinion. Following even short-term exposure to
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anti-immigrant framing, Americans become more accepting of civil rights violations against
undocumented immigrants, economic policies that directly target immigrant communities, and
social definitions outlining the differences between white and non-white groups (Fryberg et al.
2012). Bias and reasoning aside, scholars agree that the framing of non-white immigrants in the
United States as inherently criminal and detrimental to the wellbeing of society is partially
responsible for lasting racial inequalities social institutions, particularly the criminal justice
system.
Focusing Events and Policy Windows
As a second set of key concepts, focusing events and policy windows remain important to news
media in that they provide context for why certain topics (regardless of framing) are covered
more than others. Not all issues can make it to the top of any social or political agenda and,
instead, must compete for attention from lawmakers, moral entrepreneurs, and other “claim
makers” (Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Loseke 2003). As such, news media periodically revive
issues – like immigration and crime – as immediate concerns using specific and often
sensationalized stories that serve as “focusing events” (Birkland 1998) to open up “policy
windows” (Kingdon 2003). It is this rapid onset of coverage that pushes social problems (again,
like immigration and crime) onto the public stage before they are eventually replaced.
Although focusing events and policy windows as concepts more frequently appear as the
theoretical frameworks of policymaking, few scholars have attempted to operationalize the
multifaceted elements of either beyond the original definitions delineated by Kingdon (1995
[1984]). As addressed by Ridde (2009), systematically exploring the mechanisms through which
policy emerges is a complicated feat because the public policy process is “neither monolithic nor
linear” but rather, a multi-stage process with countless actors pursuing competing agendas (p.
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939). Indeed, Kingdon’s “multiple-streams model” identifies three fundamental components –
the problem stream, the policy stream, and the politics stream – that together create the
conditions for a successful policy window. While this project does not attempt to causally link
media narratives to focusing events or policy window outcomes, it does aim to establish that
media behaviors, particularly the prevalence of certain frames, correspond with these events and
policy cycles.
Multiple-Streams Model
Broadly, the multiple-streams models states that “a policy window of opportunity exists
and policy change is most likely to occur” when all three streams coincide (McBeth and
Lybecker 2018:871). First, the problem stream emerges “when an existing condition is defined
as a problem” and both by the public and policymakers deeming it worthy of being solved
through legal intervention (Farley et al. 2007:344). Problem streams transpire from focusing
events – such as the 9/11 attacks, Hurricane Katrina, or the Sandy Hook Elementary School mass
shooting, and rapidly gain national attention. They may also emerge more gradually through the
evolution of a social or environmental issue (e.g., global climate change, a housing crisis).
Pertinent to this project, the amount of feedback from policymakers and citizens
regarding a specific problem is significant to the likelihood that change will occur. Feedback can
be defined as the national conversation between the political elite and the general population,
moderated by attention granted by the media (Farley et al. 2007). It is through feedback that the
role of media in the policy process is highlighted; journalists and media organizations “fulfil an
important double-function in a democracy by informing the public of political processes and
reflecting the public opinion for the political elites” (Wettstein and Wirth 2017:262).
Second, as the problem stream gains national attention, a policy stream emerges.
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Comprised of potential solutions to the problem presented and advocated for by different “claim
makers” competing for national attention, the policy stream is constrained by the attention and
approval of political decision makers, a notably limited resource. Different stakeholders “thus
[produce] a short list of proposals” that are “technically feasible, acceptable in the policy
community, and in line with current budget priorities” (Farley et al. 2007:346). Much of this
involves capitalizing on a focusing event by immediately providing media outlets with a policy
narrative promoting a pre-existing solution – a process known as “problem surfing” (Kingdon
1995; Boscarino 2009).
Third, the political stream emerges and is “composed of such things as public mood,
pressure group campaigns, election results,” as well as “partisan or ideological distributions in
congress”, the politics stream reflects the national mood regarding support of specific policy
solutions (Kingdon 1984:152; McBeth and Lybecker 2018). The political stream indicates the
political receptibility displayed by the general population and policy decision makers toward
certain solutions. The political stream also highlights which groups adhere to which political
narratives as relayed by the media (Chermak and Weiss 1997).
The key takeaway from the multiple-streams model is that news coverage of political
issues (like immigration and crime), including the narratives promoted by media outlets, is
significant in the democratic process and is highly influential in policy outcomes (Birkland 1998;
Chermak and Weiss 1997; Menjivar 2016). That is, news media framing of social problems that
takes place around focusing events and policy windows is an integral part of the news making
process. Yet, whether and how news media frames change around these focusing events and
policy windows remains empirically unsettled, a gap that the current project seeks to fill.
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THE CURRENT STUDY
Overall then, the goal of this project is to build on prior research indicating that focusing events
and policy windows are consequential times for media agenda setting and, in turn, for
highlighting changes in the news narratives that describe substantive positions for social
problems, like immigration and crime. Thus, my research question is as follows: how does
media framing of immigration and crime change around focusing events and policy windows
over the 2014-2018 period?
Data
To answer this question, I draw data from nationally prominent, English-language newspaper
articles with a circulation of over 100,000 published between 2014 and 2018, archived through
LexisNexis Academic (now NexisUni). Seven papers satisfy these criteria: The New York Times;
The Washington Post; USA Today; St. Louis Post-Dispatch; The Buffalo News; Orange County
Register; St. Petersburg Times/Tampa Bay Times.
Using the LexisNexis repository, I conducted a filtered search for these newspapers
collecting articles with the words “immigrant” or “immigration” within five words of “crime” or
“violence” present within the body of the article, with an additional filter to remove duplicate
articles. Subsequently, I employed an ethnographic content analysis to code articles for frames
as defined by Harris and Gruenewald (2019), excluding international immigration-crime articles
and articles irrelevant or ambiguous within the immigration-crime debate.
The ethnographic content analysis process encompasses not only the collection of
documents from various information outlets, but also the reflexive interpretation of underlying
themes, messages, and meanings; the development of qualitative and quantitative content
analysis protocol; and the influence of the grounded theory approach (Altheide and Schneider
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2013, Harris and Gruenewald 2019). For the purpose of this study, these themes, messages, and
meanings are systematically coded by the presence of six frames, guided by prior empirical
criminological and sociological research. Because constant discovery and comparison are
embedded in the process of ECA, it is crucial to acknowledge that the six frames analyzed in this
study do not encompass all of the conversations revolving around immigration and crime in the
media. To accommodate for the range of additional conversations that do not fall within the
specific boundaries of the six frames utilized in this study, a seventh option – the ambiguous
frame – was included in the process. Articles with frames that do not conform to the six outlined
in this study were coded only as ambiguous and removed from the sample. Overall, while this
current study is limited to years 2014 through 2018, it contributes Harris and Gruenewald’s
previously collected and coded dataset ranging from years 1990 through 2013. Elimination of
duplicate, international, and ambiguous articles resulted in a final sample size of 1,720 articles
with a total of 3,276 frames.

Unit of Analysis
In this study, I focus on individual articles as my unit of analysis. Utilizing articles as a unit of
analysis is a valuable asset to any study concerning news media behavior, increasingly so in an
era defined by nearly instantaneous consumer access to both news media itself as well as the
political elites and journalists who fuel, interpret, and disseminate national discourse through
various print and media platforms (Karnowski, Leonhard, and Kümpel 2017). Articles,
particularly those sourced from the seven papers that meet this study’s criteria, are a valuable
unit of analysis because (1) each article itself is a discrete unit, (2) each article has the capacity to
address the immigration-crime link independent of its paper’s political leaning by employing any
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or all of the frames listed, and (3) the papers from which my sample is sourced are highly
circulated in the United States, with a combined daily subscription-based print readership of over
3.3 million Americans. Because this measure is conservative in that it does not include “unique
visitors” who access articles through free monthly allowances, or online-only readers, including
those with subscriptions to any of the papers which meet this study’s criteria, it can be assumed
that these articles reach a considerably large proportion of American consumers.
As such, because articles are discrete units published at one specific point in time by only
one paper, they can be contextualized by shifts in the national political landscape, such as the
emergence of a policy window or focusing event, as well by other attributes, including whether
the article appears on the front page or not and how many words each article contains. Articles
also grant insight to the exclusive world of professional news making because they highlight the
final results of the news journalistic process, by which editors produce stories on certain topics
with specific narratives while simultaneously excluding others (Paulussen et al. 2007).
Dependent Variable – Article Frames
My dependent variables are frames as they appear in each article, specifically the six news media
narratives as identified by Harris and Gruenewald (2019): (1) criminogenic, (2) protective, (3)
the act of immigration itself as a crime, (4) immigrants as victims of crime, (5) immigrants as
refugees from crime, and (6) a frame discussing the civil and/or legal rights of immigrants within
the criminal justice system. Because narratives are not mutually exclusive of one another, it will
be assumed that all six narratives can potentially appear in any given article.
Immigration as criminogenic. The criminogenic frame encompasses the general belief
expressed by American society that immigrants are crime-prone and that immigration as a
process is corrosive to the security of the United States, even if immigrants aren’t themselves
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committing crime. Articles with the criminogenic frame often validate pre-existing prejudices
about the immigrant population by providing coverage of the criminal acts of specific
individuals, or by acknowledging fears of crime among the foreign-born population as a whole.
Coverage of events, such as the accidental shooting of Kathryn Steinle by undocumented
immigrant José Inez García Zárate, for example, exemplifies the criminogenic frame. Bump’s
2015 Washington Post article describes the event as Kathryn being “viciously killed by a 5-time
deported Mexican with a long criminal record, who was forced back into the United States
because they didn’t want him in Mexico.” As another example, a 2014 New York Times article
by Damien Cave documenting Mexican immigration quotes a spokesman for the Tulsa County
sheriff’s office describing that “as an illegal alien it’s really difficult to find a bona fide job… but
it’s really easy to turn to the drug world and start selling drugs on the corner” (P. 12).
Immigration as protective against crime. Articles displaying the protective frame typically
utilize empirical evidence regarding immigrants and immigration to challenge the belief that
immigrants are dangerous, often asserting that immigrants actually make American communities
safer. For example, an article published in the Tampa Bay Times describes conflict between the
city of Santa Fe’s sympathetic immigration policy and federal immigration authorities, citing
studies concluding that “immigrants are less prone to commit crime than people born in the
United States” (Valverde 2016). This frame often directly contradicts the criminogenic frame
identified above.
Immigration as a crime. Although the act of improperly entering the United States is a
misdemeanor criminal offense, news sources tend to misrepresent simply being in the United
States without documentation as a criminal offense rather than the civil violation that it is.
Articles that engage in a discussion of the criminality of undocumented immigration, particularly
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how this demographic assimilates in American society, display this frame. For example,
throughout 2014, the Mexican-American border crisis was well documented in national
newspaper outlets, with calls for policy or structural changes to accommodate for “the increase
in illegal border crossings in recent years” whether such change coming in the form of a
complete border wall, or a pathway to U.S. citizenship (O’Keefe 2014:5). Likewise, a 2010
Washington Post article illustrates the same theme in quoting an Arizona resident reflecting on a
crime-control policy: “When [Governor Jan] Brewer brought this forth, she did it for those of us
on the front lines,’ Bob Dekoschak said. ‘Those of us armed. Those of us with illegals running
through our yards.’” (McCrummen 2010: A01).
Immigrants as victims of crime. Articles that contain the victims frame “describe either
the direct victimization of particular immigrants or discuss the vulnerability of the foreign-born
population to crime and violence” (Harris and Gruenewald 2019:8). While some newspapers
tend to report criminal offenses committed by immigrants, other articles, such as a 2017 New
York Times article, report stories of the vulnerability of immigrants, with consideration to
empirical evidence that this group is more likely to be victimized than their American
counterparts (Medina 2017:2). Medina describes the situation of a nonprofit agency struggling
to help victims of domestic violence in Orange County, in which “nearly half of the more than 70
new cases that [the agency] received each month came from undocumented immigrants.”
Immigrants as refugees from crime. Articles that highlight the plight of immigrants
escaping their war and violence-torn countries of origin by seeking safety in the United States are
identified as using the refugee frame. These stories often include a personal account of why an
individual flees, such as a Washington Post article describing a Honduran teenager’s account of
being tortured, “kidnapped, drugged, starved, [and] raped by ‘eight or nine’ MS-13 gang
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members” over the course of ten days as an act of revenge against her family, forcing her to flee
to the United States or risk death (Henneberger 2014).
Civil and legal rights of immigrants. Finally, some articles are less concerned with
criminal offenses committed by immigrants (or victimization, etc.), but tend to articulate on
“either the ambiguity of immigrant rights without our criminal justice systems or on new policies
designed to change the rights of foreign-born persons” typically with the goal of integrating this
community into the criminal justice system (Harris and Gruenewald 2019:9). This frame is
present when an article describes issues such as “[the replacement of] Secure Communities with
a new Priority Enforcement Program, which would only seek custody of immigrants convicted of
certain serious crimes” (Editorial Board 2015:18). Importantly, this frame often appears with
alongside other frames (e.g., criminogenic), but can also occur on its own when discussing issues
of the foreign born within the criminal justice system (e.g., bail, visitation rights, participation of
local justice agencies with federal enforcement, etc.).
Independent Variables – Policy Windows and Focusing Events
Given the focus of the current study on framing relative at specific points in time, my
independent variables are policy windows and focusing events. Unfortunately, there is no agreed
upon amount of time that is thought to constitute either event. Some periods may be lengthy –
for example, the debate leading up to the 1996 Immigration Reform and Control Act – in which
news media framing may change more gradually, take place leading up to and after the
event/window, and/or change for longer periods of time. In other cases, events may be short and
acute – for example, the Kathryn Steinle shooting or the 9/11 attacks and passage of the Patriot
Act in 2001 – where media narratives change quickly and for shorter periods of time.
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Utilizing Kingdon’s multiple-steams framework, I have identified eight focusing events
and three policy windows regarding the immigration-crime link occurring during the 2014 to
2018 period. While many focusing events and policy windows did occur throughout this period,
only policy windows and focusing events that were discussed multiple times in each of the seven
outlets are included in this analysis. To ensure a conservative measure, each focusing event is
operationalized by a one to three-month period beginning on the specific date that the event
occurred and ending after a specified interval allowing for national discourse, while each policy
window’s duration is limited to one month. A dummy variable was created to encapsulate each
individual policy window and focusing event time period, allowing me to determine which
articles were published during these intervals and which articles were not (1 = the article was
published during a policy window or focusing event; 0 = no, the article was not published during
a policy window or focusing event).
Focusing Event 1: The Central American Migrant Crisis. The Central American
Migrant Crisis emerges during the summer of 2014 “as record numbers of unaccompanied
children and families crossed the U.S.-Mexico border”, resulting in an unprecedented increase in
border apprehensions (Stinchcomb and Hershberg 2014:5). The U.S. Senate Committee on
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs holds a hearing on July 9, 2014 as detention
center and temporarily shelter capacities decrease, protests in the southwest become more
frequent, and border tensions escalate. Focusing Event 1 begins on May 15, 2014 and ends
August 15, 2014 – a three-month interval – to account for increases in border crossings leading
up to the peak in June as well as national discourse following the July 9 hearing.
Focusing Event 2: Donald Trump’s Candidacy Announcement. On June 16, 2015
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Donald Trump makes a speech officially announcing his presidential candidacy for the upcoming
2016 election cycle. It is during this speech that Trump discloses his platform and speculates on
the character of Mexican immigrants, claiming that “They’re bringing drugs. They’re bringing
crime. They’re rapists” (Time 2015). Focusing Event 2 begins June 16, 2015 and ends July 16,
2015, allowing a one-month interval for public response.
Focusing Event 3: Accidental Shooting of Kate Steinle. The accidental shooting and
death of Kate Steinle on July 1, 2015 by undocumented immigrant José Inez García Zárate
makes national headlines, further contributing to public dissonance regarding the
immigrationcrime link. Proponents of anti-immigration legislation target San Francisco’s
sanctuary city policies as a threat to national security and the wellbeing of Americans. Although
the death of Kate Steinle has prevailed in the immigration-crime link debate since the shooting,
this event begins on July 1, 2015 and ends one month later on August 1, 2015.
Focusing Event 4: Presidential Election of Donald Trump. Donald Trump is elected
president of the United States on November 8, 2016 and sworn into office on January 20, 2017.
The election of Donald Trump is significant to the immigration-crime link debate due to his
office’s commitment to the criminalization and deportation of undocumented immigrants and
endorsement of increased border security measures, including the completion of a wall along the
U.S.-Mexico border. To account for the election as well as the public’s response leading up to
the inauguration of Donald Trump, Focusing Event 4 begins on November 8, 2016 and ends
January 20, 2017.
Focusing Event 5: Central American Migrant Caravan of Spring 2018. In March 2018, a
caravan of approximately 700 primarily Honduran migrants begin a trek from Tapachula,
Chiapas, Mexico to the U.S-Mexico border. By their arrival on April 29, 2018, the caravan has
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grown to nearly 1,200 migrants despite discouragement from several Trump administration
officials, including attorney general Jeff Sessions, claiming the caravan to be “a deliberate
attempt to undermine our laws and overwhelm our system” (Semple and Jordan 2018). As such,
Focusing Event 5 begins March 25, 2018 and concludes May 29, 2018.
Focusing Event 6: Children in Cages. Following the arrival of the Central American
Migrant Caravan in April 2018 and consequential changes to immigration detention policies in
May 2018, conditions of detention centers make national news headlines as journalists permitted
to visit these centers publish images of migrant children being separated from their parents and
detained in cages, as well as multiple accounts of the mistreatment of these undocumented
minors. Focusing Event 6 begins June 1, 2018 and ends August 1, 2018, a two-month period
encapsulating early visits to detention centers by politicians and reporters, followed by one
month of consequential public discussion.
Focusing Event 7: Murder of Mollie Tibbetts. On July 18, 2018, University of Iowa
student Mollie Tibbetts disappears while jogging and is reported missing the following day.
Approximately one month later on August 21, 2018, undocumented immigrant Cristhian Bahena
Rivera leads authorities to Tibbetts’ body in a nearby cornfield after confessing to her abduction
and murder. The murder of Mollie Tibbetts becomes highly politicized as opponents of illegal
immigration utilized this event to strengthen the link between immigration and crime, despite the
Tibbetts family’s public denouncement of such claims. Focusing Event 7 begins on the day of
Tibbetts’ disappearance, July 18, 2018, and ends September 18, 2018, approximately one month
after the identification and arrest of suspect Rivera.
Focusing Event 8: 2018 Midterm Elections. The 2018 United States midterm elections
are held on November 6, 2018. The 2018 midterm elections are significant to the current study
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due to the political atmosphere in which the immigration-crime link debate is a primary element
of both Republican and Democratic platforms. The elections are also significant due to high
voter turnout, in which “fifty-three percent of the citizen voting-age population” participate in
the 2018 midterm elections, up eleven percent from the previous 2014 midterm election (Misra
2019). Focusing Event 8 begins October 6, 2018 and concludes December 6, 2018; this
twomonth period includes one month prior to the 2018 midterm election and one month
following the midterm election.
Policy Window 1: DACA Expansion. On November 20, 2014, President Obama
announced that within 90 days the USCIS would expand DACA (the Deferred Action for
Childhood Arrivals program), allowing undocumented immigrants in the program to remain in
the United States temporarily without fear of immediate deportation as well as the opportunity
for employment authorization (USCIS 2015 A). This announcement came with a series of other
executive actions with the intent to crack down on illegal immigration along the U.S.-Mexico
border; prioritize the deportation of felons rather than families; termination of the Secure
Communities program managed by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE); and to
implement requirements for a series of background checks and taxes for those who wish to
receive deferred action (USCIS 2015 B). Policy Window 1 begins on November 20, 2014, the
date that the executive actions were announced, and ends December 20, 2014, allowing
onemonth for public discourse.
Policy Window 2: Reinstatement of Secure Communities. On January 25, 2017, just five
days after his inauguration, newly elected President Trump reinstates the Secure Communities
program previously halted by President Obama’s 2014 executive actions on immigration. Secure
Communities utilizes a “federal information-sharing partnership between DHS and the FBI that
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helps to identify in-custody aliens” desirable by the Trump administration for deportation
(USICE 2018), and has grown to be a point of contention in the immigration-crime link debate
and American politics, along with the transparency of ICE. Policy Window 2 begins on January
25, 2017, the date that President Trump signed the executive order, and concludes on February
25, 2017. This interval provides one month for public discourse and responses from prominent
news media outlets.
Policy Window 3: Expiration of DACA and Sanctuary City Lawsuit. March 5, 2018,
DACA expires with without renewal legislation or additional executive actions in place, leaving
nearly 700,000 undocumented immigrants in a legal freefall. The following day, March 6, 2018,
the U.S. Department of Justice files a lawsuit amounting “to a pre-emptive strike against
[California’s] so-called sanctuary laws” (Benner and Medina 2018) in response to the January
2018 passage of SB 54 – the California Values Act – “which limits state and local law
enforcement officers’ ability to communicate with federal immigration authorities about a
person’s immigration status (Villazor and Gulasekaram 2018:556). Both events result in a policy
window beginning March 5, 2018 and concluding April 6, 2018, a one-month interval following
both events to allow for public response.
Additional Control Variables
Other article-level variables were also coded, including (1) whether or not the article appeared on
the front page of the newspaper; (2) the word count of the article; (3) whether the article’s story
concerns international or domestic issues; (4) the year of publication, in order to account for
trending over time; and (5) which of the seven newspaper outlets printed the article (to capture
publication effects shared by articles from the same paper).
Analytic Strategy
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To answer my research question regarding whether and how immigration-crime media narratives
change over time in correspondence with focusing events and policy windows, I first examine
the prevalence of each frame throughout the 2014 – 2018 period. As a second step, I use each of
the variables identified above to predict article frames across the pooled cross-section of all
articles from 2014 – 2018. My key outcome is the presence of each narrative frame (dummy
coded for whether they appear in an article or not) with my key independent variable being
whether an article was published during a policy window/focusing event, controlling for time,
publication, and other key article-level covariates. Given the dichotomous nature of my
dependent variables, I use logistic regression analysis, constructing a model for each of the frame
outcomes and comparing across them in terms of the effect of policy windows on the likelihood
of a frame being used in an article.

FINDINGS
Table 1 displays the means and standard deviations for each of the six dependent variables, eight
focusing events, three policy windows, and all other article-level variables included in this study.
First, I note that some immigration-crime frames appear more frequently than others. For
example, the criminogenic frame appears in over half of the 1,720 articles included in the sample
(55 percent), followed closely by the “immigration as crime” frame, which appears in
approximately 44 percent of all articles in the sample. These frames tend to be increasingly
antagonistic towards immigrants, appearing primarily in articles that perpetuate the
immigrationcrime link by repeatedly highlighting criminal behavior displayed by a select few
individual immigrants, and further generalizing this behavior to the general immigrant
population. In comparison, the civil/legal frame, which addresses issues such as the legal
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ambiguity of undocumented immigrants and legality of sanctuary cities, appears in
approximately 42 percent of all articles. The sympathetic-leaning frames, specifically the
protective and victims frames, appear far less frequently in the sample than the more antagonistic
frames mentioned above. The protective frame, which describes immigrants as less crime-prone
than their native-born counterparts, appears in approximately 21 percent of all articles in the
sample, while the victims frame highlighting the increased likelihood of immigrant victimization
appears in only 13 percent of all articles. Lastly, the refugees frame appears in 15 percent of all
articles.

Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for Sample of Articles (n = 1,720)

Variables
Frames (n=3276)

Mean

Std. Dev.

Criminogenic
Protective
Imm. As Crime
Victims
Refugees
Civil/Legal

0.55
0.21
0.44
0.13
0.15
0.42

0.50
0.41
0.50
0.33
0.36
0.49

All Focusing Events
FE: CA Migrant Crisis
FE: Trump Candidacy
FE: Kate Steinle
FE: Trump Election
FE: CA Migrant Crisis 2
FE: Kids in Cages
FE: Mollie Tibbetts
FE: 2018 Midterms
All Policy Windows
PW: DACA Expansion
PW: Secure Communities

0.26
0.04
0.03
0.04
0.06
0.02
0.04
0.03
0.03
0.09
0.02
0.06

0.44
0.19
0.17
0.19
0.23
0.14
0.19
0.18
0.17
0.29
0.12
0.23
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PW: DACA Expiration

0.02

0.13

2014
0.10
0.30
2015
0.15
0.36
2016
0.28
0.45
2017
0.28
0.45
2018
0.20
0.40
Word Count (ln)
6.84
0.65
Front Page
0.14
0.34
Note: Articles may have more than one frame so percentages do not sum to 100.
Second, Table 1 also shows that articles published during focusing events make up about
26 percent of all articles, while only about 9 percent of articles are published during policy
windows. In fact, two events/windows stand out as particularly prominent times when
immigration-crime articles are published. The first is the Trump election, when 6 percent of all
articles between 2014 and 2018 were published, while the second is the passage of the Secure
Communities Act, when another 6 percent of articles were published. No other policy window or
focusing event had more than 4 percent of articles published during their time periods.
Finally, third, Table 1 shows that few immigration-crime articles appear on the front page
of these large, national papers (only about 14 percent) and articles are, on average, about 934
words in length (e6.84). However, there are important differences in when these articles were
published. Twenty-eight percent of all immigration-crime articles were published in the years
2016 and 2017, whereas only 20 percent of all articles were published in 2018, 15 percent in
2015, and only 10 percent in 2014. Not surprisingly, the election and inauguration years
(20162017) of Donald Trump are the years with the most articles written, dovetailing with the
same observation regarding the focusing events above.
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Figure 1. Comparison of Frame Prevalence, 2014-2018
To better illustrate the frequency of specific immigration-crime narratives relative to key
events/windows, Figure 1 depicts the prevalence of each individual frame as it appears during all
focusing events, all policy windows, or during any other time during the 2014 to 2018 era. Other
periods, also referred to as outlying periods, refer to time intervals that are absent of a focusing
event or policy window. First, I note that only the criminogenic and victims frames appear more
frequently during outlying periods than during focusing events and policy windows. Second, the
protective frame is the only frame that appears more often during focusing events than policy
windows and outlying periods. Third, the immigration as a crime frame, civil/legal frame, and
refugees frame all occur more frequently during policy windows than focusing events and
outlying periods. Taken together, some frames appear more frequently during policy windows
and focusing events (civil/legal, refugee, immigration as a crime, protective), while other frames
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appear at higher rates during periods outside of those policy windows and focusing events
(criminogenic, victims). However, I note that this may be because the majority of articles are
published during these other periods, as indicated in Table 1. I return to this issue in my
multivariate models.
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Figure 2. Changes in Frame Prevalence Over Time, 2014-2018
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Figure 3. Changes in Frame Prevalence Over time, 2014-2018
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To further illustrate changes in framing over time, Figure 2 shows the monthly prevalence
over the study period for the most prevalent frames (criminogenic, immigration as a crime,
civil/legal), while Figure 3 does the same for the less prevalent narratives (protective, refugees,
victims). Beginning with Figure 2, from 2014 to 2018, the prevalence of the civil/legal frame
appears to decrease, excluding one spike in prevalence during the winter of 2014 (in
correspondence with Policy Window 1, the announcement of the DACA expansion).
Simultaneously throughout the 2014 to 2018 period, the criminogenic and immigration as crime
frames steadily increase. The criminogenic frame first begins to increase in prevalence during
the spring of 2014 (around the time of Focusing Event 1, the Central American Migrant Crisis)

and then subsequently spiking in the fall of 2015 (near the time of Focusing Event 3, the
accidental murder of Kate Steinle by undocumented immigrant José Inez García Zárate).
Likewise, the immigration as crime frame steadily increases over time, with one spike in
prevalence occurring during the spring of 2014 (in correspondence with Focusing Event 1), and
two notable spikes later occurring during the summer of 2015 around the time of Focusing Event
2, Donald Trump’s presidential candidacy announcement.
Meanwhile, Figure 3 shows that although the prevalence of the victims frame decreases
overall, two significant spikes in prevalence occur during 2014 and 2015. The first spike in
prevalence of the victims frame occurs in spring of 2014 during Focusing Event 1 (the Central
American migrant crisis), while the second spike occurs approximately one year later during
spring 2015. While the protective frame overall increases in prevalence over time, there are four
notable increase events as visualized by Figure 3. The first spike occurs in the spring of 2014 as
the migrant crisis emerges, while the second spike appears during fall 2015 following the Kate
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Steinle death. The third spike in the prevalence of the protective frame appears during the
summer of 2016 prior to the presidential election of Donald Trump. Finally, the fourth spike in
prevalence of the protective frame appears in the spring of 2018 in correspondence with the
expiration of DACA and the emergence of a second Central American Migrant Caravan. Lastly,
Figure 3 depicts the refugees frame gradually increasing over the 2014 to 2018 period, featuring
two noteworthy spikes in the prevalence of this frame. The first spike in prevalence occurs
during the spring and summer of 2014 as the Central American migrant crisis begins to make
national headlines in the United States, while the second spike occurs during spring 2016.
Overall then, Figures 2 and 3 depict increases in the criminogenic frame, immigration as
crime frame, protective frame, and refugees frame throughout the 2014 to 2018 period, while
also showing decreases in the civil/legal and victims frames. Spikes in the prevalence of each
frame tend to correspond with specific focusing events and policy windows as well. However,
while instructive, the figures and tables presented above are only descriptive and cannot take into
account that some of these patterns in immigration-crime framing may be due to external factors
(e.g., larger national trends each year) or characteristics of news making (e.g., longer articles,
more front page coverage) at specific points in time. To systematically examine how narrative
framing might differ during policy windows and focusing events net of other important
covariates, I construct a series of multivariate models.
Turning to the multivariate analyses, Table 2 displays the results of logistic regression
models predicting the likelihood that a frame will be present in an article during any focusing
event or policy window, including front page publication, logged word count, and year of
publication with 2014 serving as the reference. Table 3 displays the same results of logistic
regression models, but predicting the likelihood that a frame will appear in an article as a
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function of each individual focusing event and policy window. For all models in Table 2 and 3, I
cluster the standard errors across papers to account for unmeasured similarities in articles that
appear in the same newspaper outlets.
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Table 2. Logistic Regression Models Predicting the Odds of a Frame Appearing in an Article as a
Function of Focusing Events, Policy Windows, and Other Key Covariates (n=1,720)

Frames
Criminogenic Protective
Focusing
Event

Imm. As
Crime

Victims

Refugees

Civil /
Legal

1.092

1.210

1.273

0.804

1.279*

0.966

(0.311)

(.269)

(.179)

(.194)

(.155)

(.982)

0.966

1.252

1.431*

0.499**

1.357

1.202*

(.130)

(.254)

(.231)

(.119)

(.361)

(.100)

2015

8.163***
(3.069)

12.790***
(4.668)

3.207***
(.981)

1.274
(.362)

0.461**
(.128)

0.847
(.179)

2016

8.500***
(2.935)

5.899***
(1.532)

4.622***
(.863)

0.566*
(.144)

0.558***
(.086)

0.724*
(.117)

2017

11.569***
(4.676)

8.900***
(3.268)

7.549***
(1.477)

1.471*
(.234)

0.781
(.175)

1.393
(.239)

2018

12.885***
(3.779)

7.507***
(2.308)

8.949***
(2.889)

0.577
(.171)

0.714
(.192)

1.532**
(.203)

1.101

1.022

1.286***

0.966

1.444*

1.216*

(.098)

(.113)

(.068)

(.088)

(.246)

(.096)

0.985

0.572**

1.305

0.844

1.026

1.168

(.196)

(.105)

(.209)

(.213)

(.160)

(.193)

0.073***

0.031***

0.024***

0.220*

0.019

0.175**

(.051)

(.025)

(.010)

(.161)

(.027)

(.096)

.0678

.0432

.0691

.0317

.0198

.0220

Policy
Window

Word Count
(ln)
Front Page

Constant

Pseudo R2
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Note: Odds ratios displayed with a standard error in parenthesis. All models included paper
clustered standard errors to adjust for shared variance between articles published in the same
outlet (*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001.)
Beginning with Table 2, I note five key findings. First, there are few systematic
differences in the likelihood of a frame appearing in an article during focusing events, except for
one exception. Holding all other variables constant, articles published during a focusing event
are approximately 28 percent more likely to include the refugee frame than articles not published
during a focusing event (odd ratio = 1.279, 𝑝<.05). Yet, second, policy windows are more likely
to include several frames (and less likely to include one frame). Specifically, articles published
during a policy window are 43 percent more likely to include the immigration as a crime frame
(odds ratio = 1.431, 𝑝<.05) and approximately 20 percent more likely to include the civil/legal
frame (odds ratio = 1.202, 𝑝<.05), but are nearly 50 percent less likely to include the victims
frame (odd ratio = .499, 𝑝<.01).
Third, Table 2 also shows that articles published from 2015 to 2018 have greater odds of
the criminogenic, protective, and immigration as a crime frames being present within the article
than articles published in 2014. Fourth, some frames are less likely to be present in articles over
time. Specifically, the refugees frame is nearly 54 percent less likely to be present in articles
published during 2015 and approximately 44 percent less likely to be present in articles
published during 2016, as compared to articles published during 2014. Similarly, the civil/legal
frame is less likely to appear in articles published during 2016 than articles published during
2014, although the likelihood of the civil/legal frame appearing in an article published during
2018 is 53 percent greater than articles published during 2014. Lastly, articles published on the
front page of a newspaper are nearly 43 percent less likely to include the protective frame (odds
ratio = .572, 𝑝<.01) than articles not published on the front page.
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Table 3. Logistic Regression Models Predicting the Odds of a Frame Appearing in an Article as a
Function of Focusing Events, Policy Windows, and Other Key Covariates
Frames

FE: CA Migrant
Crisis

FE: Trump
Candidacy

FE: Kate
Steinle
FE: Trump
Election

FE: CA Migrant
Crisis 2
FE: Kids in
Cages
FE: Mollie
Tibbetts
FE: 2018
Midterms

Criminogenic

Protective

1.116

0.841

(.687)

(.148)

Imm. As
Crime

1.416
(.719)

Victims

Refugees

Civil /
Legal

0.645*

5.087***

0.822

(.130)

(1.146)

(.179)

2.672***

1.857)

0.610*

0.572

0.482

0.464
***

(.568)

(1.045)

(.153)

(.173)

(.242)

(.096)

3.654***

1.990

2.068***

0.691

0.533*

1.203

(1.353)

(.908)

(.346)

(.463)

(.159)

(.283)

0.471***

0.811

1.464***

1.494**

0.430*

1.964
***

(.080)

(.213)

(.097)

(.196)

(.177)

(.328)

0.840

0.649

0.893

0.603

1.924***

1.079

(.347)

(.184)

(.312)

(.283)

(.229)

(.396)

1.187

1.314

1.615

0.565

2.251**

1.089

(.180)

(.359)

(.471)

(.292)

(.534)

(.307)

1.044

0.930

1.108

0.983

1.159

(.191)

(.231)

(.463)

(.511)

(.347)

0.437
***
(.062)

0.536*

0.497*

0.399*

1.526

1.960***

0.578
**

(.145)

(.161)

(.159)

(1.617)

(.309)

(.105)
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Note: Odds ratios displayed with standard errors in parenthesis. All models include
paperclustered standard errors to adjust for shared variance between articles published in the
same outlet (*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001.)
Table 3, Cont.
Frames
Protective

Imm. As
Crime

Victims

Refugees

Civil /
Legal

0.968

0.594

0.189*

0.334

1.224

1.396
(.720)

(1.211)

(.359)

(.157)

(.413)

(.495)

0.948

1.306

1.507

0.477*

2.173***

1.090

(.138)

(.455)

(.326)

(.179)

(.298)

(.086)

0.805

1.170

1.676

1.590

0.989

1.222

(.176)

(.603)

(.560)

(.790)

(.664)

(.310)

2015

5.740**
(3.044)

8.018***
(3.164)

2.921***
(.527)

1.223
(.397)

1.090
(.420)

0.875
(.131)

2016

10.581***
(6.167)

5.280***
(1.310)

4.195***
(1.309)

0.431**
(.128)

1.190
(.250)

0.595**
(.093)

2017

12.684***
(7.329)

7.429***
(2.932)

6.941***
(1.650)

1.249
(.283)

1.263
(.492)

1.321*
(.170)

2018

15.970***
(8.357)

7.683***
(3.308)

10.031***
(3.117)

0.422
(.257)

1.029
(.250)

1.725*
(.411)

1.148

1.045

1.281***

0.948

1.415*

1.207*

(.109)

(.130)

(.074)

(.077)

(.241)

(.092)

1.013

0.577**

1.305

0.832

0.996

1.148

(.197)

(.103)

(.213)

(.205)

(.160)

(.188)

Criminogenic
PW: DACA
Expansion

PW: Secure
Communities

PW: DACA
Expiration

Word Count
(ln)
Front Page
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Constant

0.052**

0.032***

0.027***

0.292*

0.125**

0.194**

(.049)

(.029)

(.011)

(.172)

(.019)

(.094)

.0907

.0544

.0776

.0392

.0480

.0319

Pseudo R2

Note: Odds ratios displayed with standard errors in parenthesis. All models include
paperclustered standard errors to adjust for shared variance between articles published in the
same outlet (*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001.)
Moving on to Table 3, I note five key findings regarding the likelihood that a frame will
appear in an article as a function of each individual focusing event and policy window. First, as
previously addressed, articles published during focusing events are overall more likely to include
the refugees frame. According to Table 3, articles published during the first Central American
migrant crisis (Focusing Event 1); second Central American migrant crisis (Focusing Event 5);
Focusing Event 6, during which undocumented minors were detained in cages; and the 2018 U.S.
midterm elections (Focusing Event 8) are all more likely to include the refugees frame than
articles published outside these focusing events. Only articles published around the death of
Kate Steinle (Focusing Event 3) and the U.S. presidential election of Donald Trump (Focusing
Event 4) are less likely to include the refugees frame.
Second, similarly to Table 2, Table 3 indicates that articles published during both the
announcement of the expansion of DACA (Policy Window 1) and the reinstatement of Secure
Communities (Policy Window 2) are less likely to include the victims frame. With 2.173 greater
odds (𝑝<.001), the refugees frame is only more likely to be present in articles published during
Policy Window 2.
Third, articles published following Donald Trump’s candidacy announcement and the
death of Kate Steinle are both more likely to include the criminogenic frame, but differ regarding
the immigration as a crime frame. Articles published in conjunction with Trump’s candidacy
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announcement are 39 percent less likely to include the immigration as a crime frame, while
articles published in response to the death of Kate Steinle have 2.068 greater odds (𝑝<.001) of
having the immigration as a crime frame present within an article. Likewise, articles published
during Focusing Event 4 – during which Donald Trump was elected president and inaugurated –
are more likely to include the immigration as a crime frame, victims frame, and civil/legal frame.
Alternatively, articles published during this same time period are nearly 53 percent less likely to
include the criminogenic frame and 57 percent less likely to include the refugees frame.
Lastly, articles published during the 2018 U.S. midterm elections (Focusing Event 8) are
less likely to include four frames than articles not published during this time period: the
criminogenic frame; the protective frame; the immigration as a crime frame; and the civil/legal
frame. On the other hand, the refugees frame is 96 percent more likely to be present in an article
during the 2018 midterm elections. Worth mention, is that only the articles published during
Focusing Event 8 are less likely (over 50 percent) to include the protective frame.
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DISCUSSION
Over the past several decades, the American political landscape has grown increasingly polarized
on a variety of issues ranging from religious liberty to gun control, especially considering the
advancements in communicative technology that afford Americans multiple platforms for
information consumption, and consequentially, political participation (Fourney et al. 2017, Hare
and Poole 2014). Although the issue of race has long been a critical point of contention in
American politics and society, immigration, particularly along the Southern border, has
reemerged over the past two decades as a fundamental element of both the Republican and
Democratic Parties’ platforms (Hare and Poole 2014). Within the rhetoric of immigration,
particularly from Mexico and Central America, crime remains an important part of the debate as
to how the foreign-born reshape communities and the fabric of the nation. Because the majority
of Americans are not well-versed on the intricacies of immigration or crime and utilize
information and opinions presented by the media to inform their beliefs, examining media
behavior is crucial to understanding contemporary American beliefs and attitudes toward
immigration and crime.
Several recent studies conclude that while newspaper readership is gradually declining as
a consequence of increasing news media presence online, newspapers remain “a critical part of
the American news landscape” and continue to impose significant influence on the American
public regarding the immigration-crime link debate (Garrett and Stroud 2014, Pew Research
Center 2019). Therefore, systematically examining the ways in which narratives and framing
shift over time, particularly in relation with specific events, is imperative to understanding the
multifaceted relationship between news media, agenda setting, and the American public. As
such, the objective of this study has been to systematically examine changes in media narratives
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in response to focusing events and policy windows, specifically asking: how does media framing
of immigration and crime change around focusing events and policy windows over the 20142018
period?
First, I found that some immigration-crime frames are more prevalent than others during
the 2014 – 2018 period. For example, the criminogenic frame appears in over half of all articles,
while the immigration as a crime frame appears in 44 percent of articles. In contrast, the
protective frame – which is most consistent with empirical research – appears in only 21 percent
of articles (the refugee and victims frames appear even less frequently in immigration-crime
articles). Because articles can contain multiple frames, some appear together in greater
frequency. For instance, articles that contain the criminogenic frame are significantly more
likely to also include the protective, immigration as a crime, and victims frames.
As a second major finding, some focusing events and policy windows are associated with
a greater likelihood of some frames occurring as compared to others. When all focusing events
are pooled together, only the refugee frame is more likely to be present. At the same time, Table
3 illustrates that when measured separately, independent focusing events are more likely to
include multiple frames not limited to the refugee frame. For example, articles published
following the death of Kate Steinle are significantly more likely to include both the criminogenic
and immigration as a crime frames, while the refugee frame is actually less likely to be present.
Third, I note similar findings for policy windows, as well. When all policy windows are
pooled together, both the immigration as a crime and civil/legal frames are more likely to be
present. Similar to focusing events, when each policy window is examined independently, we
find that additional frames are more likely to appear. For example, articles published following
the Trump administration’s announcement to reinstate Secure Communities are more likely to
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include the refugees frame, while neither the immigration as a crime frame or civil/legal frame
are more likely to be present in articles published during this period. Likewise, longer articles
are also more likely to include the immigration as a crime frame, refugee frame, and civil/legal
frame, likely due to the complex intricacies of the topics in which these frames appear, as they
require more substantial explanation than other topics.
Finally, fourth, some focusing events and policy windows are associated with a
decreased likelihood of some frames occurring as compared to others. For instance, while
articles published during Trump’s announcement of his intention to run for president are more
likely to include the criminogenic frame, they are also less likely to include the immigration as a
crime and civil/legal frames. As another example, articles published during both President
Obama’s immigration executive orders announcement and President Trump’s reinstatement of
Secure Communities are less likely to include the victims frame. Other characteristics of
immigration-crime articles appear to decrease the likelihood of some frames, as well. Articles
that are published on the front page of a newspaper are somewhat less likely to include the
protective frame than articles not published on the front page of a newspaper.
Broader Impacts and Theoretical Relevance
Ultimately, this study contributes to ongoing research regarding the intersection of media and
public opinion by highlighting discrepancies between the products of empirical research and the
institutions of journalism and news media. Despite widespread consensus among criminologists
that immigration is unassociated with violence in most communities (Ousey and Kubrin 2018),
the newspaper outlets included in this study published articles utilizing the narratives most
critical of immigration – the criminogenic and immigration as a crime frames – with greater
frequency throughout the 2014 – 2018 period than any of the other frames. Indeed, these two
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frames were used over twice as often the protective frame that best aligns with empirical
research. In short, the national news media often provide distorted narratives of immigrants or
the process of immigration.
Further, because frames are not equally distributed across each independent focusing
event and policy window, these findings indicate that frames are strategically employed within
articles, and that variations in framing are dependent upon the circumstances and context during
which articles are published. Importantly, this finding aligns with Kingdon’s multiple-streams
framework, in which the “problem stream” emerges as an issue or set of circumstances capture
the attention of a national audience and open the grounds for dialogue. It is during this national
discussion that the media landscape systematically responds to events and issues by promoting or
adhering to specific narratives, promoted by those who are either conforming or combating
power structures in the political arena, that are then consumed by the general population. For
example, my results indicate that news media narratives are not monolithic and do not wax and
wane in one direction over time. Instead, frames increase and decrease as they are used by media
(and the claim makers engaging media outlets) to highlight specific aspects of the immigrationcrime debate when external events occur. Therefore, this study also aligns with the growing
body of literature that acknowledges agenda setting as a calculated process by which editorial
decisionmakers intentionally construct and impose narratives that both reflect and inspire the
general public’s detrimental association between immigration and crime.
My findings also speak to changes in news media behavior more broadly. For example, a
key finding from the current study shows the criminogenic frame to be more prevalent among
articles included in the sample than any other frame, particularly more so than the protective
frame. While this expectation appears antagonistic towards news media outlets on the surface,
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contemporary literature and theoretical frameworks of journalistic behavior acknowledge a shift
in American news media reporting practices during the post-9/11 period, during which
information-related programming gave way to attention-grabbing “trauma-driven content”
(Serani 2008:240). Increasingly, in the current period’s political atmosphere, trauma-driven
content, especially when occurring during external focusing events, is overrepresented in news
media publications and often depicts events with “an exaggerated importance, [facts] taken out
of context” and “highly misleading portrayals” that are intended to reveal dangerous trends in
immigration and crime (Martin 2018:119). Thus, my findings illustrate the role played by
external events or specific policy periods in generating the opportunity for specific
immigrationcrime content designed to grab attention.
More so, recent studies find that trauma-oriented narratives, specifically those that
conceptualize a threat or “villain” beyond the limits of one individual, have an increased ability
to amplify emotional responses to an event or issue, and “may promote [collective] development
of intrusive thoughts about the event [or issue]” that can persist with socially detrimental effects
(Holman et al. 2020:119). Often, media logic is the rationale behind such publications: media
outlets wish to increase readership and viewing for financial gain and heightened status, rather
than to incite widespread panic amongst the public. Because Americans primarily receive
information regarding immigrants and crime from these outlets more readily than they do from
academic sources, though, this tradition of sensationalized reporting cultivates an atmosphere in
which the public is both desensitized to trauma and loss while simultaneously over aware of a
predetermined threat that may not empirically exist, particularly as is the case with Latino
immigrants. For instance, the accidental shooting of Kate Steinle by García Zárate became
highly politicized as media coverage of Steinle’s death reached national headlines in 2015.
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Despite the ultimate acquittal of all murder and manslaughter charges brought against García
Zárate in 2017, the narrative of dangerous immigrants lurking in the shadows of American
society persisted throughout legal proceedings. Such dialogue further aggravated discrepancies
within the immigration-crime link debate by encouraging the public to characterize immigrants
as inherently threatening, as well as drawing criticism to the legality and safety of sanctuary
cities.
Although this study does not measure the role of race in media coverage of immigrants
and crime, a plethora of studies agree that race and ethnicity permeate discourse about the
“overall social and economic well-being” of the United States (Rivera 2014:45), particularly with
negative portrayals of Latinx immigrants (Moriearty 2010). For instance, a 2008 report by the
Brookings Institute found that “coverage of Latinos and immigration” focuses “almost
exclusively on undocumented [Latinx} immigrants and immigration, lacks important context,
and often frames immigration as a crisis” (Reny and Manzano 2016:197). With consideration to
the 2014-2018 period, the issue of Latinx immigrants and immigration became a focal point in
the national news media landscape in mid-2015, and remains so, primarily as a result of Donald
Trump’s candidacy announcement, anti-immigrant rhetoric, and closed borders platform (Finley
and Esposito 2019). As such, a reasonable assumption can be made about this study’s findings
that not only are immigrants framed negatively and dangerously more so than they are positively
and sympathetically, as is the case with the criminogenic and immigration as a crime frame, but
that the immigrants in question are overwhelmingly Latinx.
The findings of this study also conform to the body of literature revolving around
contemporary media behavior in reference to the rarity of the protective and victims frames
throughout the articles included in our sample. Although the victims frames can be considered
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trauma-driven content, this frame places ownership of the trauma back onto American society
and American institutions, as opposed to placing blame on immigrants themselves, and therefore
creates a narrative that Americans, in general, are less likely to seek out (Serani 2008). As well,
because the protective frame does not align with media logic – in the sense that this frame quells
concerns about immigration and crime rather than generalizing immigrant perpetrators to the
immigrant population – these findings were not unexpected.
In addition, the pattern of findings across the multivariate models suggests that, while
some frames (e.g. the criminogenic, immigration as a crime, and civil/legal frames) are more
prevalent than others (the protective, victims, and refugee frames), the majority of articles do not
express sentiment that is fundamentally anti-immigration. Rather, they acknowledge the
immigration-crime link and refute its assumptions by employing additional frames that often
counter more antagonistic narratives (e.g., point and counterpoint). For example, although the
protective frame appears in only 21 percent of articles included in our sample, as opposed to the
criminogenic frame which appears in 55 percent of articles, these two frames often appear
alongside one another. This suggests that a significant proportion of these articles are at least
somewhat sympathetic toward immigrants and attempt to utilize empirical research concluding
that immigrants are less crime-prone than Americans, rather than antagonistically portraying
behaviors exhibited by the immigrant population as inherently criminal. As an example,
Valverde’s 2016 Tampa Bay Times article acknowledges Donald Trump’s claim that Mexican
immigrants are murderers and rapists – thereby employing the criminogenic frame – while going
on to cite the American Immigration Council’s report finding that immigrant males are
significantly less likely to be incarcerated for violent crimes than their native-born white
counterparts, in which the protective frame is employed. Put simply, media framing is complex
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and involves the interplay between often competing narratives appearing during the same policy
windows and focusing events, including occasionally within the same articles.
As previously noted, longer articles are more likely to include the immigration as a crime
frame, refugee frame, and civil/legal frame than shorter articles in the sample. Articles which
utilize these frames may be longer because the issues which these frames cover tend to be more
complex, and time consuming, than topics presented using other frames. The criminogenic
frame, for example, is often present in articles that quote Donald Trump during the 2014-2018
time frame. These articles are short, to the point, and typically opinion pieces – especially with
consideration to the limited nature of Trump’s claims, as well as readily available data that
precisely contradicts such claims. Alternatively, as is the case with the immigration as a crime
frame, refugee frame, and civil/legal frame, these articles tend to explore the intricacies of
immigration, regional immigrant communities, and the socioeconomic conditions of the sending
countries from which immigrants come and are, therefore, longer than articles in which other
frames are present. Such a pattern relative to the length of articles is pertinent to understanding
the relationship between media behavior and public opinion, especially considering changes in
consumer behavior over the past two decades. As Molyneux finds in his 2017 study, while
widespread media access via smartphone is advantageous for consumers because it increases
access to news and information by proxy, this rapid, instantaneous access has created a
“snacking” or “grazing” culture in which consumers spend more time browsing the news, but
less time ingesting information and understanding issues in which society is concerned.
Therefore, some immigration-crime frames likely reflect the need to write for the grazing public
with shorter, more simplistic narratives.

Limitations and Future Research
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Overall, when systematically measuring shifts in media behavior utilizing the frames, I find that
frames do not appear arbitrarily over time, but rather correspond with specific events. Yet, this
study is not without limitations that may direct future empirical endeavors. First, I only use data
from seven of the largest national newspapers, rather than examining local or regional
newspapers. It remains possible that policy windows and focusing events may provoke greater
change in some places than in others, a point this study cannot address. Second, I also only
utilize data from print newspapers, rather than pulling data from all Internet, television, and
social media-oriented news outlets. Although many of the outlets in our sample circulate print
articles as online supplements, it would not have been feasible for this study to capture all of the
sources with articles that engage in the immigration-crime link debate. Future research would do
well to include a variety of news media platforms, particularly featuring online-only platforms,
in examining how media frame and compose narratives regarding immigration and crime.
Third, the temporal span of the articles included in this study ranges only from 2014 to
2018, while the association between immigration and crime has intensified in media presence
and public opinion since the turn of the 21 st century. While measuring Donald Trump’s rise to
the presidency is valuable for understanding media behavior over the past half-decade, especially
considering that Trump became the primary political claims maker as early as his candidacy
announcement, the immigration-crime link debate extends far back beyond 2014. Additional
research systematically examining changes in framing and media behavior prior to 2014 may be
insightful to understanding the degree to which Trump’s rhetoric manipulated and informed
national discourse (see for example, Harris and Gruenewald 2019).
Fourth, although this study is concerned with media behavior regarding immigration and
crime, it does not address differences in media behavior regarding race or immigrants’ countries
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of origin. In the 2014 to 2018 period, concerns regarding the U.S.-Mexico border dominated
national dialogue regarding immigration and crime, during which Mexican immigrants became
the primary focus of the majority of articles included in the sample. The current study does not
measure or address differences in narratives between Mexican immigrants or refugees from
Central America or Syria, although these topics also flooded national discourse during this
period. While it is beyond the scope of the current study, future research might acknowledge the
role of race in media narratives and how they pertain to public opinion.
As socioeconomic conditions in sending countries continue to deteriorate and news
outlets continue to prioritize antagonistic narratives about the foreign-born, the
immigrationcrime link debate is likely to persist at the national scale for the foreseeable future.
Systematically examining media behavior as it responds to immigration and crime is pertinent to
understanding the intersection of public opinion, consumer behavior, and political outcomes,
particularly so as technological advancements expand further into the routine activities of daily
life. With widespread access to smartphone technology, Americans are consuming news at a
higher and quicker rate than ever before. As a result, American consumers neglect to critically
analyze information through an empirical lens, and therefore increasingly accept “fake news”
sources at a higher rate than before (Pew Research Center 2018). Overall, the burden of proof
falls upon American consumers to understand and navigate systematic changes in media
behavior around social and political events as a means to inform public opinion on immigration
and crime.

48

REFERENCES
Abrajano, Marisa A., Zoltan Hajnal, Hans J. G. Hassell. 2017. “Media Framing and Partisan
Identity: The Case of Immigration Coverage and White Macropartisanship.” Journal of
Race, Ethnicity, and Politics 2(1):5-34.
Allcott, Hunt, and Matthew Gentzkow. 2017. “Social Media and Fake News in the 2016
Election.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 31(2):211-36.
Altheide, David L., and Christopher J. Schneider. 2013. Qualitative Media Analysis. Los
Angeles, California: SAGE Publications.
Barber, James David. 1992. The Pulse of Politics: Electing Presidents in the Media Age. New
York: Routledge.
Benner, Katie, and Jennifer Medina. “Trump Administration Sues California Over Immigration
Laws.” The New York Times, March, 2018.
Birkland, Thomas A. 1998. “Focusing Events, Mobilization, and Agenda Setting.” Journal of
Public Policy 18(1):53-74.
Boscarino, Jessica E. 2009. “Surfing for Problems: Advocacy Group Strategy in US Forestry
Policy.” Policy Studies Journal 37 (3): 415–34.
Bump, Philip. “Donald Trump’s lengthy and curious defense of his immigrant comments,
annotated; A new defense, with the same old mistakes.” Washington Post, July, 2015.
Cave, Damien. “Crime, Migrants and Politics Intersect on Tulsa Streets.” The New York Times,
June, 2014.
Cervantes, Andrea Gomez, Daniel Alvord, and Cecilia Menjivar. 2018. “’Bad Hombres’: The
Effects of Criminalizing Latino Immigrants through Law and Media in the Rural
Midwest.” Migration Letters 15(2):182-96.
Chermak, Steven M., and Alexander Weiss. 1997. “The Effects of the Media on Federal
Criminal Justice Policy. Criminal Justice Policy Review 8(4):323-42.
Digital History. 2016. “The Revolution of 1800.”
http://www.digitalhistory.uh.edu/disp_textbook.cfm?smtID=2&psid=2978
Editorial Board. “Lost in the Immigration Frenzy.” The New York Times, July, 2015.
Edwards, Ryan D., and Mao-Mei Liu. 2018. “A new look at immigration and employment in the
U.S. since 2005.” UC Berkeley: Center on the Economics and Demography of Aging 137.

49

Ellis, Mark. 2006. “Unsettling Immigrant Geographies: US Immigration and the Politics of
Scale.” Tijdschrift voor Economische en Social Geografie 97(1):49-58.
Entman, Robert M. 2004. Projections of Power: Framing News, Public Opinion and U.S.
Foreign Policy. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press.
Entman, Robert M. 2007. “Framing Bias: Media in the Distribution of Power.” Journal of
Communication 57:163-73.
Farley, Joshua, Daniel Baker, David Batker, Christopher Koliba, Richard Matteson, Russell
Mills, and James Pittman. 2007. “Opening the policy window for ecological economics:
Katrina as a focusing event.” Ecological Economics 63(2-3):344-354.
Finley, Laura, and Luigi Esposito. 2019. “The Immigrant as Bogeyman: Examining Donald
Trump and the Right’s Anti-immigrant, Anti-PC Rhetoric.” Humanity and Society
44(2):178-97.
Finnegan, Michael. 2016. “Donald Trump emphasizes immigrants’ crimes as campaign nears
finish.” Los Angeles Times, November 6, 2016: A00.
Fryberg, Stephanie A., Nicole M. Stephens, Rebecca Covarrubias, Hazel Rose Markus, Erin D.
Carter, Giselle A. Laiduc, and Ana J. Salido. 2012. “How the Media Frames the
Immigration Debate: The Critical Role of Location and Politics.” Analysis of Social
Issues and Public Policy 12(1):96-112.
Gallup. 2007. “Immigration.” http://www.gallup.com/poll/1660/immigration.aspx.
Garrett, R. Kelly, and Natalie Jomini Stroud. 2014. “Partisan Paths to Exposure Diversity:
Differences in Pro- and Counterattitudinal News Consumption.” Journal of
Communication 64:680-701.
Gramlich, John. 2019. “5 facts about crime in the U.S.” Pew Research Center.
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/10/17/facts-about-crime-in-the-u-s/
Grigoryan, Nune. 2019. “It is not what we thought: New media and democracy.” New Media &
Society 21(6):1403-08.
Hare, Chritopher, and Keith T. Poole. 2014. “The Polarization of Contemporary American
Politics.” Polity 46(3):411-29.
Harris, Casey T. and Jeff Gruenewald. 2019. “News Media Trends in the Framing of
Immigration and Crime, 1990-2013.” Social Problems 67(3):452-70.

50

Henneberger, Melinda. “Fleeing violence, gangs and abuse, only to be caught in immigration
limbo.” Washington Post, November, 2014.
Hohmann, James. 2011. “Poll: Immigration Enforcement Divide.” Politico, February 3rd.
Holman, E. Alison, Dana Rose Garfin, Pauline Lubens, and Roxane Cohen Silver. 2020. “Media
Exposure to Collective Trauma, Mental Health, and Functioning: Does It Matter What
You See?” Clinical Psychological Science 8(1):111-24.
Karnowski, Veronika, Larissa Leonhard, and Anna Sophie Kümpel. 2017. “Why Users Share the
News: A Theory of Reasoned Action-Based Study on the Antecedents of News-Sharing
Behavior.” Communication Research Reports 00(00):1-10.
Kingdon, John. W. 1995. Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies. New York: Longman.
Kurban, Can, Ismael Pena-Lopez, and Maria Haberer. 2017. “What is technopolitics? A
conceptual schema for understanding politics in the digital age.” IDP. Revista De
Internet, Derecho y Politica 24:3-20.
Lichter, Daniel T., Johnson, Kenneth M. 2009. “Immigrant Gateways and Hispanic Migration to
New Destinations.” International Migration Review 43: 496–518.
Martin, Brian. 2018. “Analysis of a beat-up: The structuring of a sensational media story.”
Faculty of Law, Humanities and the Arts 24(2):117-33.
McBeth, Mark K., and Donna L. Lybecker. 2018. “The Narrative Policy Framework, Agendas,
and Sanctuary Cities: The Construction of a Public Problem.” Policy Studies Journal
46(4):868-93).
Medina, Jennifer. “Too Scared to Report Abuse, For Fear of Being Deported.” The New York
Times, April, 2017.
Menjivar, Cecilia. 2016. “Immigration Criminalization in Law and the Media: Effects on Latino
Immigrant Workers’ Identities in Arizona.” American Behavioral Scientist 60(56):597616.
Milan, Stefania. 2017. “Data Activism as the New Frontier of Media Activism” Pp. 1-23 in
Media Activism in the Digital Age. PA: Routledge.
Misra, Jordan. 2019. “Voter Turnout Rates Among All Voting Age and Major Racial and Ethnic
Groups Were Higher Than in 2014.” United States Census Bureau.
https://www.census.gov/library/stories/2019/04/behind-2018-united-statesmidtermelection-turnout.html

51

Molyneux, Logan. 2017. “Mobile News Consumption: A Habit of Snacking.” Digital Journalism
6(5):634-50.
Moriearty, Perry L. 2010. “Framing Justice: Media, Bias, and Legal Decisionmaking.” Maryland
Law Review 69(4):850-909.
Morstatter, Fred, Liang Wu, Uraz Yavanoglu, Stephen R. Corman, and Huan Liu. 2018.
“Identifying Framing Bias in Online News.” ACM Transactions on Social Computing
1(2):1-18.
O’Keefe, Ed. “Border funding at standstill as recess for Congress nears.” Washington Post, July,
2014.
Ousey, Grahm C., and Charis E. Kubrin. 2018. “Immigration and Crime: Assessing a
Contentious Issue.” Annual Review of Criminology 1: 1-22.
Pew Hispanic Center. 2015. “Chapter 4: U.S. Public Has Mixed Views of Immigrants and
Immigration. Hispanic Trends. https://www.pewhispanic.org/2015/09/28/chapter-4--uspublic-has-mixed-views-of-immigrants-and-immigration/.
Pew Research Center. 2019. “Newspapers Fact Sheet.” Journalism & Media.
https://www.journalism.org/fact-sheet/newspapers/
Paulussen, Steve, Ari Heinonen, David Domingo, Thorsten Quandt. 2007. “Doing It Together:
Citizen Participation In The Professional News Making Process.” Observatorio
3:131154.
Reny, Tyler, and Sylvia Manzano. 2016. “The Negative Effects of Mass Media Stereotypes of
Latinos and Immigrants.” Pp. 159-212 in Media and Minorities: Questions on
Representation from an International Perspective, edited by G. Ruhrmann, Y. Shooman,
and P. Widmann. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht Gmbh & Co.
Ridde, Valery. 2009. “Policy Implementation in an African State: An Extension of Kingdon’s
Multiple-Streams Approach.” Public Administration 87(4):938-54.
Rivera, Christopher. 2014. “The Brown Threat: Post-9/11 conflations of Latina/os and Middle
Eastern Muslims in the US American imagination.” Latino Studies 12(1):44-64).
Ryan, Marie-Laure. 2007. “Chapter Two: Toward a definition of narrative.” Pp. 27-35 in The
Cambridge Companion to Narrative. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Scheufele, Dietram A., and David Tewksbury. 2007. “Framing, Agenda Setting, and Priming:
The Evolution of Three Media Effects Models.” Journal of Communication 57: 9-20.

52

Semple, Kirk, and Miriam Jordan. “Migrant Caravan of Asylum Seekers Reaches U.S. Border.”
The New York Times, April, 2018.
Serani, Deborah. 2008. “If It Bleeds, It Leads: The Clinical Implications of Fear-Based
Programming in News Media.” Psycoanalysis and Psychotherapy 24(4):240-50.
Sigelman, Lee, and David Bullock. 1991. “Candidates, Issues, Horse Races, and Hoopla:
Presidential Campaign Coverage, 1888-1988.” American Politics Quarterly 19(1):5-32.
Stinchcomb, Dennis, and Eric Hershberg. 2014. “Unacompanied Migrant Children from Central
America: Context, Causes, and Responses.” CLALS Working Paper 7:5-13.
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services A. 2015. You may be able to request Expanded
DACA. Washington, DC: Government printing Office. (Also available at
https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/ExecutiveActions/ExecActionFlier_Full
_En.pdf.)
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services B. 2015. 2014 Executive Actions on Immigration.
https://www.uscis.gov/archive/2014-executive-actions-immigration.
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement. 2018. Secure Communities.
https://www.ice.gov/secure-communities.
Valverde, Miriam. “Santa Fe Mayor Defends Sanctuary Cities, Says Studies Don’t Show
Increase in Crime.” Tampa Bay Times, November, 2016.
Valverde, Miriam. “Libertarian Candidate Says Mexican Immigrants More Law-Abiding Than
U.S. Citizens.” Tampa Bay Times, July, 2016.
Villazor, Rose, and Pratheepan Gulasekaram. 2018. “The New Sanctuary and Anti-Sanctuary
Movements.” U.C. Davos Law Review 52(1):549-70.
Wettstein, Martin, and Werner Wirth. 2017. “Media Effects: How Media Influence Voters.”
Swiss Political Science Review 23(3):262-69.
Zong, Jie, and Jeanne Batalova. 2015. “European Immigrants in the United States.” Migration
Policy Institute.
https://www.migrationpolicy.org/search?search_api_views_fulltext=zong+batalova&fiel
d_publication_type=95&created%5Bdate%5D=09%2F01%2F2001&created_1%5Bdate
%5D=

53

APPENDIX
Table 4. Pearson’s Correlation Matrix for All Key Variables Across Sample of Articles. (n=1,720).
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Criminogenic (1)
Protective (2)
Imm. As Crime (3)
Victims (4)
Refugee (5)
Civil/Legal (6)
All Focusing Events (7)
FE: CA Migrant Crisis (8)
FE: Trump Candidacy (9)
FE: Kate Steinle (10)
FE: Trump Election (11)
FE: CA Migrant Crisis 2 (12)
FE: Kids in Cages (13)
FE: Mollie Tibbetts (14)
FE: 2018 Midterms (15)
All Policy Windows (16)
PW: DACA Expansion (17)
PW: Secure Communities (18)
PW: DACA Expiration (19)
2014 (20)
2015 (21)
2016 (22)
2017 (23)
2018 (24)
Word Count (ln) (25)
Front Page (26)

(1)

(2)

1.00
.27***

1.00

.23***

.03

1.00

.17***

-.07**

-.12***

1.00

-.04

-.01

-.01

.06*

1.00

-.03

-.09***

.36***

-.01

.09***

1.00

.00

.01

.04

-.06*

.04

.01
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-.10***
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-.28***
-.01
.00
.09***
.11***
.05*
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-.04
-.01
.04
.01
-.03
.01
-.05*
.04
.01
-.14***
.11***
-.06*
.05
.02
-.00
-.07**

.04
.05*
.11***
.07**
-.02
.06*
-.09***
.08***
.07**
-.20***
-.10***
-.04
.11***
.16***
.10***
.07**

.00
-.03
-.05*
-.03
-.01
-.03
-.03
-.02
-.01
-.00
.06*
-.08**
.10***
-.08**
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-.06*
.02
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.05
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.08**
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.05*
-.06*
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.03
.08***
.02

.03
.05
.06*
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.00
.06*
.01
.04
.05*
.02
-.06*
-.11***
.09***
.09***
.06**
.04

.42***
.24***
.35***
.31***
.31***
-.12***
-.07**
-.14***
.06*
.09***
.03
-.10***
-.33***
.39***
.04
.03
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-.03
-.06*
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-.05
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.59***
-.08***
-.12***
-.12***
-.10***
-.01
.01

-.04
-.03
-.04
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-.03
-.06*
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-.02
-.06*
.43***
-.11***
-.11***
-.09***
-.07**
-.05*
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-.04
-.04
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-.05*
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-.07**
.48***
-.12***
-.12***
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-.07*
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Note: *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001.

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

(10)

(11)

1.00
-.04
-.05*
-.05
-.04
-.08**
-.03
-.06*
-.03
-.08***
-.10***
-.34***
-.09***
-.12***
.07**
.04

Table 4, Cont.

(12)

(13)

FE: CA Migrant Crisis 2 (12) 1.00
FE: Kids in Cages (13) -.03

1.00

(14)

(15)

(16)

(17)

(18)

FE: Mollie Tibbetts (14) -.03
FE: 2018 Midterms (15) -.03

.10***

1.00

-.04

-.03

1.00

All Policy Windows (16) .16***

-.06**

-.06*

-.06*

1.00

-.03

-.02

-.02

.40***

1.00

-.05*

-.04

-.04

.78***

-.03

1.00

.03
-.07**
-.09***
-.13***
-.13***
.41***
.04
.04

-.02
-.06*
-.08**
-.11***
-.11***
.37***
.02
.02

-.02
-.06*
-.08**
-.11***
-.11***
.36***
.03
.04

.43***
.08***
-.13***
-.19***
.24***
.00
-.05
.05*

-.02
.39***
-.05*
-.08**
-.08**
-.06**
-.10***
-.01

-.03
-.08***
-.10***
-.15***
.39***
-.12***
-.01
.06*

PW: DACA Expansion (17) -.02
PW: Secure Communities (18) -.03
PW: DACA Expiration (19) .42***
2014 (20) -.05
2015 (21)

-.06*
-.08***
2017 (23) -.09***
2018 (24) .28***
-.01
Word Count (ln) (25)
.00
Front Page (26)
2016 (22)

55

Note: *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001.

(19)

1.00
-.04
-.06*
-.08***
-.08***
.27***
.00
.02

